Trinity University

Digital Commons @ Trinity
Psychology Faculty Research

Psychology Department

1996

Practical Aspects of Emotion and Memory
Paula T. Hertel
Trinity University, phertel@trinity.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.trinity.edu/psych_faculty
Part of the Psychology Commons

Publication Details
Basic and Applied Memory Research: Theory in Context
Repository Citation
Hertel, P. T. (1996). Practical aspects of emotion and memory. In D. Herrmann, C. McEvoy, C. Herzog, P. T.
Hertel, & M. K. Johnson (Eds.), Basic and applied memory research: Theory in context (vol. 1, pp.
317-336). Lawrence Erlbaum.

This Contribution to Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Psychology Department at Digital
Commons @ Trinity. It has been accepted for inclusion in Psychology Faculty Research by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ Trinity. For more information, please contact jcostanz@trinity.edu.

CHAPTER

SIXTEEN

Practical Aspects
of Emotion and Memory
Paula T. Hertel
Trinity University

Can anyone doubt that the study of emotion and memor y should have
practical implications? Surely not those among us who have had emotional
expe riences and sometimes try to forget them, to remember them, or to

remember other things w hile having them. Extreme examples include the
witness to a robbery and the victim of abuse. Less dramatically but far more
commonly, anxious or depressed people perform everyday acts that are

m emory dependent. Indeed, a practical or useful science of memory should
have a great deal to say about how memory works under such emotional

conditions.

Research on emotion and memory is also practical for the science at large,
because it can extend the usefulness of a general theory. This practical
aspect provides the g lu e for this review. Together with many other re
searchers i n theoretical aspects of emotion and memory, I argue that the
memorial correlates and consequences of emotion are best viewed as per
taining to the effects of emotion on the focus and control of attention. This
is a fortunate vantage point for practitioners, who want to know what they
can and cannot depend on and control when emotion is involved in me
morial episodes. Thus, this chapter briefly and selectively describes some
recent literature o n emotion and memory from the theoretical perspective
of attentional control and from the practical perspective of how the findings
might be useful to people who have feelings.
The description is restricted to the domain of negative events and states.
Elation, passion, other positive states, and the events that produce them also
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deserve our attention but, apart from being difficult to capture or establish
experimentally, they are unfortunately too transient in our culture to cry out
for practical approaches. Further, although a wide variety of psychological
phenomena, disorders, and practices are related to memory under n egatively
emotional circumstances, I describe only those that have received the most
attention from cognitive psychologists: eyewitness, flashbulb, and possibly
repressed memories, and the ubiquitous disorders of anxiety and depression.
Even with these restrictions, the bodies of relevant research are still quite
large; my description, therefore, often cites recently published reviews in
stead of the important empirical investigations. Finally, a portion of the
literature on depression and memory is examined in greater detail for pos
sible therapeutic applications.

THEORETICAL OVERVIEW
The construct

attention is

central to many theoretical accounts of emotion

and memory phenomena. Essentially, these phenomena can be understood
as a function of the focus of attention during an initial episode or when it
might come to mind on later occasions. The accounts described in this
chapter differ according to the phenomena they were designed to address.
What they all have in common is reference to a continuum of automatic to
controlled mental procedures, as elucidated by early attention theorists like
Kahneman 0973), Posner and Snyder 0975), and Shiffrin and Schneider

0977). Briefly stated, automatic procedures are native to the organism or
develop from practice. Although they sometimes can be intentionally initi
ated or interrupted, they do not require attention or intention for their per
formance. Controlled procedures, in contrast, are those that require attention
or conscious focus. In spatial metaphors, controlled mental acts draw on
limited attentional capacity. In this chapter, I argue that many accounts of
emotion and memory emphasize the control of attention by emotional stimu
lation as a predictor of performance on memory tasks.
A convenient departure point is found in Bower's 0992) review of the role
played by surprising events, both in engendering arousal and in focusing
attention on critical aspects of the events. At the time of such focus, arousal
activates the autonomic nervous system (ANS) and hormonal systems, which
in turn directly affect storage activities in the brain (see Gold, 1992; LeDoux,

1992; McGaugh, 1992). Similarly, Mandler 0992) claimed that "a majority of
occasions for visceral (sympathetic nervous system) arousal follows the
occurrence of some perceptual or cognitive discrepancy, or the interruption
or blocking of some ongoing action" (p. 98). Mandler, as well as other emotion
theorists (e.g., Oatley &Johnson-Laird, 1987), stressed the adaptive function
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of the link between arousal and attention to discrepancies.The link functions
to establish immediate resolution or future avoidance (see Bower, 1992). For
example, Mineka 0992) suggested that vigilance for sources of threat,
augmented by controlled procedures for directing attention away from the
event (avoidance), can maintain fearful states on future occasions (see the
earlier formulation of emotionally disordered memory by Williams, Watts,
MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988). What is ultimately implied by such accounts is
that, although unexpected events incur arousal and initially demand attention,
the linkage of arousal and attention does not guarantee memory for the
initiating events; memory also depends on how attention is subsequently
controlled and where it is focused.
Among the first to address matters of attentional control during aroused
states was Easterbrook 0959), who contended that increases in arousal are
associated with a narrowing in the focus of attention.Later, several accounts
of memory during emotional states seem to have combined the Easterbrook

hypothesis with the idea that attentional capacity is reduced by arousal (see
especially Hasher & Zacks, 1979). In summarizing his earlier work on both
emotion and memory, Mandler (1992) stressed the limited capacity of con
scio usness as the important factor in emotion/memory interactions. His the

ory of memory makes the distinction between procedures for activating and
procedures for elaborating: Activation is automatic, given an external stimu

lus, and establishes later feelings of familiarity, whereas elaboration requires
conscious or deliberate activity and establishes the pathways for retrieval.
His theory of emotion stresses two features: arousal and expressed value.
The former is visceral and produces internal events, whereas the latter reflects
cognitive appraisal and requires attentional capacity.Therefore, "The expe
rie nce of emotion preempts the limited capacity of consciousness .... [When

this occur s] other processes that require such capacity will be impaired"
(Man dler, 1992, p . 99). Some variant of this position has informed research
on emo tion and memory for approximately two decades. In particular, mem

ory researchers have emphasized impairments in attention-demanding pro
ce dures (e.g., organization and elaboration) that support performance on

later tests of deliber ate memory.
In short, the limitation on the focus of attention, central to all cognition,
is also central to understanding interactions of emotion and memory. Internal
stimulation, external stimulation, and related past stimulation all vie for at
tention; an increase in the strength or distinctiveness of one source should

mean that others are less well attended. Therefore, research efforts should
and often do-concentrate on the focus of attention during episodes of
possible emotional relevance. This approach has the parsimonious advantage
of blending the findings of improved memory for events "in focus" and
impaired memory for unattended aspects of experience.
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MEMORY FOR EMOTIONAL EVENTS

The nature of memoty for emotional events-naturally occurring or simu
lated-depends on the focus of attention in a variety of ways. When events
are surprising and therefore arousing: (a) attention is drawn to the central
aspects that elicit the arousal via an innate orienting response, (b) those
aspects enjoy the retention advantage of physiological arousal, and (c) their
distinctiveness incurs elaborative processing that increases the chance that
they will later come to mind. These claims have been abstracted primarily
from Christianson's 0992) and Reisberg and Heuer's 0992) reviews of both
real-world studies of eyewitness memory and laboratory simulations. It is
important to keep in mind, however, that the nature of the event itself is
often used to classify the memory as emotional. Arousal is sometimes as
sumed, rather than measured, and when arousal can be assumed it is not
necessarily accompanied by an evaluative component that, according to
Mandler 0992), constructs an emotion. This issue arises in the ensuing
synopses of research on eyewitness memory, flashbulb memory, and re
pressed memories.
Eyewitness Memory
Based on the Easterbrook hypothesis, Christianson (1992) and Reisberg and
Heuer 0992) argued that arousal restricts the focus of attention to the central
details of presumably emotional events and therefore away from peripheral
aspects, and thereby produces corresponding facilitation and impairment in

memory for the respective aspects. Naturalistic studies of eyewitn ess testim ony
frequently show high positive correlations between judged emotionality (in
retrospect) and both the reported vividness of the events and accurate memot y
for their central details. In such studies, however, evidence regarding accuracy

is typically obtained through comparisons across repeated tests (with all the
accompanying potential confounds) and lacks the appropriate controls.
Laboratory simulations have produced somewhat inconsistent results, but the
inconsistency might be artifactual of whether accuracy or error is measured.
In the latter case, findings of poor memory for arousing events might be due
to confabulations to fill in the gaps established by the narrow focus of attention
(see Reisberg & Heuer, 1992). On balance, both reviews conclude that
laboratory findings are consistent with the attentional-focus account.
Orientation to the central details of arousing events cannot, however, be
solely responsible for enhanced memory, according to C hristianson 0992).
When eye fixations were controlled during initial exposure to emotional or
neutral slides, memory for the fixated details was enhanced by emotional
content. These findings suggest that ANS arousal and accompanying hor
monal changes increase retention (see Gold, 1992). Christianson also pro-
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posed that ongoing arousal might underlie findings of poor performance on
immediate tests, due to "the difficulties in refiring of those neurons that are
firing repeatedly in the reverberating circuit" (p. 299). In a related vein,
Reisberg and Heuer 0992) suggested that the physiological effects of arousal
on encoding ultimately slow the rate of forgetting central details. Physiologi
cal prcx:lucts of arousal might therefore account for findings of better memory
for emotional events only after a delay in testing.
Long-term retention of emotional events might also be facilitated by their
distinctiveness, according to both reviews. For example, Christianson 0992)
noted that the role of distinctiveness is separable from that of emotional
arousal, because parallel findings are obtained with nonemotional but unusual
events. The role of distinctiveness, in the sense of the unexpected, however,
might not be separable from that of physiological arousal and accompanying
retention via ANS mechanisms (see Bower, 1992). Therefore, it might be more
important to separate effects of distinctiveness from those of elaboration.
When distinctive events are elaboratively processed (compared to when they
are not), we typically see a greater advantage on tests of deliberate remem
bering (Hunt & McDaniel, 1993). Furthermore, the degree of elaborative
processing might be limited by the focus of attention on one's aroused state.
In that regard, it is interesting to consider the recent analysis of eyewitness
memory for traumatic events by Yuille and Tollestrup 0992). In a manner
consistent with Mandler's framework, these authors argued that arousal ac
companying "remarkable" events is sometimes associated with an internal
focus on the physiological state itself. Under those circumstances, even mem
ory for central details should be impaired. Laboratory research should there
fore investigate the conditions that differentiate internal from external atten
tional foci. This issue is also relevant in investigations of another class of
remarkable events: flashbulb memories.

Flashbulb Memories
Flashbulb memories are supposed to be emotional. In fact, a recent volume
of papers on the topic was entitled Affect and Accuracy in Recall (Winograd

& Neisser, 1992). Brown and Kulik (1977) coined the term.flashbul b to refer
to personal memories of finding out about culturally important events (such
as the assassinations of public figures) and claimed that surprise and expected
consequentiality of the event are their identifying characteristics. These two
characteristics have been inconsistently measured (and usually in the absence
of appropriate controls), but when they do co-occur the phenomenon mighr
qualify as an emotional memory according to Mandler's criteria (cf. Mandler,

1992). This is because surprise can be counted on to invoke arousal, and
expected consequentiality suggests that the arousal is evaluated in a cognitive
context. For example, in a recent multinational study, Conway et al. (1994)
recruited subjects who were likely to vary in the extent to which the event
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(Thatcher's resignation) would be perceived as important and potentially
consequential. They found that the initially reported strength of emotional
reaction mediated the formation of flashbulb memories

when

the initially

perceived importance of the event was high. However, because none of these
measures was taken at the time of reception we cannot be sure that the event
itself was emotional. This is typically the case.

In general, evidence regarding flashbulb memories is difficult to interpret,
at best (see Brewer, 1992). The tradition is to measure me mory for the
reception event (the subject's own experience) rather than the original event,

presumably because people hear the news from others rather than witnessing
it firsthand. (Otherwise, of course, the phenomenon would be eyewitnes s
memory.) Reception events usually leave no permanent objective record;

therefore, researchers are almost always in the position of measuring memory
for a memory, and consistency is not the same as accuracy (see McCloskey,
Wibble, & Cohen, 1988). Moreover, appropriate control events are hard to
identify (see Brewer, 1992). Another interpretive difficulty is invited by lack
of knowledge regarding the focus of attention during reception, although
some evidence suggests that central details from the initial report are quite
well remembered (see Christianson, 1992). Reisberg and Heuer 0992) sug
gested that attention is likely to be focused on other people, whose ow n
emotional reactions are unexpected in the context of everyday relations.

Social aspects of remembering the flashbulb event were stres sed by Loftus
and Kaufman 0992); one's audience at the time of rememb ering directs the
nature of the report. Such social functions also remind us that elaborative
procedures can easily produce inaccuracies in memory for eyewitness and
flashbulb events. In attending to related information (elaborating) during the
flashbulb event or its rehearsal, we increase the likelihood that such informa

tion will be the focus of attention on subsequent occasions of remembering.
Finally, Brewer 0992) alerted us to consider distinctiveness to be a po
tentially potent variable in understanding flashbulb memories, given its im
portance in ordinary personal memories. Events that are considered surpris
ing

and personally important should undergo

elaborative processing for the

purpose of reconciliation, according to evolutionary frameworks (see Wil
liams et al., 1988), unless the event is threatening and therefore sets the
occasion for avoidance. Although they might sometimes evoke emotions,
flashbulb events pose little or no personal threat, unlike the events assumed
to be responsible for the next category of emotional memories.
"Repressed and Recovered" Memories
Eyewitness, flashbulb, and presumably repressed memories are all records
of distinctive events, although the last category is surely more personally
relevant and arousing (Loftus & Kaufman, 1992). Because records of the
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original flashbulb (reception) event and previously repressed events are
rarely obtainable, the conservative stance is to doubt the special status ac
corded to each class of memory phenomena, and particularly to doubt the
accuracy of "recovered" memories of previously repressed events. Loftus
(see Loftus & Kaufman, 1992) cautioned us to consider that recovered memo
ries might be replete with error motivated by social context, just like flashbulb
memories, and urged us to examine the social functions of such reports.
Compared to recovery, the concept of repression itself has received more
attention by memory researchers (see the review by Holmes, 1990). According
to Kihlstrom and Hoyt (1990), for example, repression functions to deny con
trolled access to prior experience, and this function suggests various attention
centered explanations. Guided by ongoing motives (see Simon, 1994), atten
tion can be diverted from the traumatic event and reduce the degree of
elaborative processing. Similarly, attention can also be diverted away from
later cues for reminding. Kihlstrom and Hoyt (1990) argued that the person
might initially be aware of unwanted thoughts produced by such cues and
deliberately avoid thinking about them in ways more akin to intentional

suppression than to repression. But through practice, they argued, suppres
sion becomes automatic and resembles repression. In a different vein, Bower
0990) suggested that repressionlike failures could also result from retroactive
interference by incompatible and much more common experiences in the
.
same domain; later recovery would then arise from the use of appropriate
retrieval cues in the therapeutic context. Like Loftus, howe er, he warn d that
distortions are likely. In these ways the focus of attention at the tim of
reme mbe ring accounts for repression and possible recovery or confabulation.
Therapists suspect repression when they observe emotional reactio that
seem unusual in the client's current context and therefore suggestive of

:

�

:

�

cer tain kinds of earlier emotional experiences. In this regard, Tobias,
Kihlstrom, and Schacter (1992) argued that when emotional responses them
selves reflect the effects of past experience, they belong to the category of

implicit memory phenomena, because the subject does not intentionally
invoke the past in making the response. Although some of the measures
used experimentally to support this claim do not qualify as full-blown emo
tional reactions, they have affective characteristics. Johnson and Multhaup

0992), for example, reviewed studies in the mere-exposure effect on pref
erences for unfamiliar melodies and people; in Korsakoff patients, such
effects are dissociated from recognition judgments. Tobias et al. 0992) de
scribed clinical case studies in which a variety of affectively related measures

(e.g., judgments of emotional value) showed similar dissociations from tra
ditional measures of intentional remembering. Furthermore, these examples
in the literature on human memory are reminiscent of a variety of studies

that used truly emotional responses by other organisms as evidence of prior
learning. In this regard, LeDoux 0992) reviewed evidence for the "indelibility
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of emotional memory" (p. 279). This evidence suggests that emotion

as

memory cannot be extinguished, even though the event that gives rise to
the emotion might be forgotten.
Finally, perhaps the best developed model of emotion as memory in
humans is Johnson's MEM (see Johnson & Multhaup, 1992). Johnson pro
posed that perceptual and reflective subsystems differentially contribute to
affective experiences. "Recapturing affect [emotion as memory] depends on
whether it is possible to reinstate the records of the initial processing that
led to the initial affective response" (p. 58). If the initial episcxle was not
elaborated in the reflective subsystems, failures in deliberate recall are likely.
However, perceptual characteristics of a current context that are similar to
those of an earlier traumatic event certainly could evoke arousal along a
generalization gradient. Through practice, such arousal could be accompa
nied by diversion of attention. Moreover, a skillful redirection of attention
during emotional episodes might have some small chance of recovering a
repressed memory if perceptual memories are sought. In contrast, cuing via
reflective subsystems invites dangers of elaborative distortions. In short, the
concept of attention is central to understanding that tmly traumatic experi
ences affect subsequent behavior in the absense of aware remembering (the
hallmark of suspected repression). It may also be central to designing ex
perimental analogues for the recovery of repressed memories.

Practical Guidelines
What can we tell the practitioner? Because arousal directs, narrows, or re
directs the focus of attention in presumably automatic ways, initial control
may be difficult, if not impossible. Beyond that point, avenues for self-in
itiated and environmentally directed control should be examined, particularly
in the context of understanding that motives direct attention. In describing
the experimental psychologist's approach to understanding repression, for
example, Bower 0990) compared it to motivated "unlearning" and forget
ting. Presumably, most of us are motivated to remember what we were
doing on some culturally important occasion and to forget more perso nally
traumatic events (unless legal or retributional motives exist at the time).
Clearly, the motivation to comply with instmctions in n onemotional labora
tory settings can guide attention during initial exposure and subsequently
(see Bower, 1990), but is such control possible when the event is "emo
tional"? Issues arising from this question concern the effects of arousal on
initiating and sustaining attention in ways related to one's motives (fulfilling
intentions). For example, if the experience invokes conscious evaluation of
arousal, attention should be hard to focus on peripheral aspects potentially
relevant to one's prior intentions. In effect, the arousing event may establish
new motives that direct attention to their service. Much the same might be
said when emotional states are not established directly hy the current event.
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MEMORY IN EMOTIONAL STATES

There is a fine line between memory for emotional events and memory in
emotional states. One way to draw it is to note whether the event produces
the state (as is assumed in the research described above). When the state
precedes the event to be remembered, I classify the phenomena as memory
in emotional states. In this category, the event itself might be emotional
(although verbal materials related to emotions often constitute the "events"
in such research). If so, researchers usually are interested in mood-congruent
and mood-incongruent memories. If not, research is aimed at understanding
the conditions for impaired memory in emotional states. In both categories
of research, a variety of complicating factors arises from the need to under
stand the state itself.
Sometimes research participants have been diagnosed as emotionally
disordered, sometimes they are selected from nondiagnosed populations
according to their responses on various mood inventories, and sometimes they
volunteer to be placed in transient moods. To what extent do arousal and its
evaluation characterize these states? Although some researchers in the area
argue that experimentally induced moods are more intense, others make
distinctions between mood and emotion on the basis that arousal characterizes
only the latter (see Mandler, 1992). However, the degree of arousal surely
varies according to the induction technique or the specific disorder, and within
these categories as well. For examples of low arousal, consider endogenous
depression without accompanying anxiety, or the lethargic states established
by some induction techniques (see Revelle & Loftus, 1992). Regarding the
f ocus of attention on one's aroused state, it is important to know that most
clinical disorders are characterized by self-focused attention (see the review
by Ingram, 1990). Some mood-induction techniques, however, seem to be
characterized by experimental "demand" in ways that are irrelevant to one's
state. Subjects might be cued by the nature of the induction to focus attention
on particular materials or encouraged to conform to implied expectations for
poor attention and performance. (We should also be alert to demand charac
teristics of some selection procedures.) As well, there are reasons to believe
that effects established by inductions differ from those in natural states (e.g.,
Hertel & Rude, 1991b). That possibility, coupled with a concern for practical
value, has led me to emphasize studies on naturally occurring emotional states
and disorders in the following description.
Emotion-Congruent Attention and Memory

The ensuing description is guided by Williams et al.'s 0988) evolutionary
perspective on attention and memory in anxious and depressed people,
because it was developed to address clinical phenomena in the context of
traditional cognitive research. The main idea is that anxiety evolved to fa-
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cilitate detection and subsequent avoidance of potential threat, whereas
depression evolved to facilitate reflection on loss and failure. In cognitive
terms, "anxiety preferentially affects the passive, automatic aspect of encod
ing and retrieval, whereas depression preferentially affects the more active,
effortful aspects of encoding and retrieval" (Williams et al., 1988, p. 173).
The term preferentially is the key to understanding emotionally congruent
biases in attention and subsequent memory.
Recently, Mathews and MacLeod 0994) reviewed evidence thac anxious
people have trouble ignoring or inhibiting emotionally congruent aspects
of events and show selective detection of these aspects. (Such biases are
found in the performance of depressed subjects only to the extent that
anxiety is also present.) The bias seems to emerge when the emotional
nature of the materials varies within trials not across which suggests that

�

cy the bias is automatic

the nature of the bias is to prioritize detecti n. In anxie

rather than intentional, because it occurs when subjects cannot report the
content (e.g., in studies using masked Stroop techniques).
Mathews and MacLeod's (1994) review also concluded that self-referential

tasks performed at initial exposure produce better recall for congruent ma
terial, but only when they are performed by depressed people. This effect
is usually attributed to elaborative processing, achieved by focusing atte ntion

on related thoughts and events, particularly when they are perceived as
"causally belonging" to one's mood state (Bower, 1992). Elaboratio n estab
lishes attentional procedures whereby the event
can be deliberately b rough t
to mind on later occasions. In fact, evidence
of emotional congruence in

depression seems to be restricted to performance on tests of deliberate
remembering (e.g., Denny & Hunt, 1992). Implicit memory tests-to the
extent that they invite more automatic procedures--might be expecte d to

show emotionally congruent effects with anxious subjects (see Williams et
al., 1988), but the few studies that have done so have not been replicated
(also see Mineka, 1992).
In general, Mathews and MacLeod found no solid evidence for threat
congruent memory in anxiety. This is to be expected if anxious people
subsequently focus attention away from detected sources of threat, both
during initial exposure and on later occasions, in order to avoid further
arousal. Indeed, sometimes impaired memory for threat-related materials is
found. The consequence, according to Mineka 0992), is that in natural
environments the lack of controlled attention to the source of potential threat
prevents an accurate evaluation of its extent and perpetuates anxiety. On
the other hand, depression might be exacerbated by attention to negative
aspects of current and prior experience (see Williams, 1992).
Depression is characterized by automatic negative thoughts and rumina
tions (see Beck, 1976; Gotlib, 1992). Ruminations involve sustained attention
that is presumably motivated by the urge to resolve discordance associated
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with the negative thought and to escape the depressed mood. These implicit
goals, however, may be almost impossible to reach when the content of the
automatic thought is particularly traumatic. Then, the person is motivated
to suppress such u nwanted thoughts, because they ultimately serve to ex
acerbate the mood. (Evidence for mood-incongruent recall of less traumatic
negative materials may have similar roots in mood regulation; see Parrott &
Sabini, 1990.) According to Wegner 0989), thought supp�ession is achieved
initially by focusing attention on random distractors in the environment;
however, through repeated attempts and failures, these distractors become
associated with the unwanted thoughts and (ironically) serve to cue them.
This "rebound" effect appears to be stronger for emotionally charged and
unresolved events than for neutral content.
Wegner's (1989) treatment of the rebound effect places it in the category
of implicit memory paradigms. The thought comes to mind in the absense
of intent to remember-indeed, in the presence of the intent

not to

remem

ber. As such, when past events come to mind against one's will, the memory
process can truly be described as automatic (Jacoby, Toth, & Yonelinas,

1993). In this regard, the rebound effect shows evidence of mood congruence
(e.g., Howell & Conway, 1992), unlike other paradigms that presumably
measure implicit memory.

Impaired Memory

�
�
�e�n is that their

Although depressed people are bothered incessantly by automa ic negativ
thoughts, they complain about poor memory. What they

deliberate attempts to remember often fail. Indeed, there ts ltttle reason to
notice that memory functions "normally" in more automatic or implicit ways
(provided that the original event had been attended; see Hertel, 1994; Hertel
& Hardin,

1990). Similarly, the literature on memory impairments in both

anxious and depressed states has concentrated on tests of deliberate remem
bering. Consider first the case of anxiety.
Anxiety might indeed establish priorities for detecting and subsequently
avoiding threatening events, but how should it affect memory when threat
is absent? In line with Easterbrook (1959), Eysenck (1982) noted that anxious
arousal might impair memory by narrowing the focus of attention during
initial exposure in ways that exclude important aspects of more attention
demanding tasks. When arousal has been measured, however, it seems to
have contributed little to the relationship between anxiety and performance
(see Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). Further, Eysenck and others also noted that
arousal is just one component of anxiety. The other component-worry
represents the focus of attention on self-relevant and typically distracting
information. Although distraction should impair subsequent memory, anx
ious subjects sometimes compensate for their distractibility by increasing the
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effort they expend on the task, because they are motivated to avoid the
negative consequences of failure. (In other words, imagined failure can be
a source of threat to be avoided by anxious people. ) In this regard, Eysenck
and Calvo 0992) proposed that processing efficiency (a ratio of effectiveness
to effort) is impaired; anxious people expend more effort to maintain a
certain level of effectiveness and are therefore less efficient (see Eysenck &
Calvo, 1992, for a review of the relevant literature).
This account of performance in anxious states is both similar to and different
from typical accounts of performance in depressed states. Both stress the
importance of attentional factors, but the latter suggest that depression limits
the degree of effort that

can

be applied to cognitive tasks (e.g., Hasher &

Zacks, 1979; Williams et al., 1988). (Some research in social cognition is much
more consistent with Eysenck & Calvo's framework, however; the review by
Weary, Marsh, Gleicher, & Edwards, 1993, suggests that depression is associ
ated with increased effort, motivated by the desire for control. )
In one of the more frequently cited accounts of depression and memory,
Ellis and Ashbrook (1988) claimed "that being sad ties up some capacity as

a result of thinking about one's sad state, so that less capacity is available
to be allocated to the criterion task" (p. 27). Their support for this assumption
was provided by evidence of impaired recall of materials from more difficult
or attention demanding tasks. The key factor in their claim, how ever, is not

"tied-up" or reduced capacity, as stressed by the authors and othe rs (e. g.,
Hartlage, Alloy, Vazquez, & Dykman, 1993), but the embedded assumpt ion
regarding the focus of attention. The experimental support described earlier,

for example, was established by mood-induction techniques; in the "de
pressed" condition, college subjects read statements designed to focus their
attention on feeling sad, hopeless, and lethargic. Subsequent experiments

on thought listing following such inductions in fact showed that this atten
tional focus was maintained during a criterion task (Seibert & Ellis, 1991).
Therefore, neutral and self-irrelevant materials from "orienting" tasks are
peripheral to the focus of attention and should suffer on later tests of de

liberate memory, as can be seen in studies of memory for emotional events

(see Christianson, 1992).
Can we assume that attention is similarly focused away from neutral
aspects when the subjects are naturally depressed? Unwanted thoughts tend
to occur on occasions when the mind is not otherwise occupied (Bower,

1992; Wegner, 1989). Such occasions include those during which there is
little environmental control of attention, such as Bower's example of falling
asleep at night. Probably a large proportion of tasks used in memory research
poorly controls the focus of attention. For example, because we generously
provide time for subjects to perform incidental orienting tasks, their minds
can wander until the next display. Some subjects, however, do show what
my colleagues and I have called "cognitive initiative" (see Hertel & Hardin,
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1990); they continue to focus attention on the task and related materials in
ways that are not required by our instructions. Later, during recall and
recognition tasks, we do not tell subjects precisely what to think about, but
some subjects voluntarily attend to elements of the past and present that
help them perform. Some subjects behave strategically. Of course, these are
the processes we want to bring under experimental control so that we can
establish their causal importance, but when experimental constraints are
imperfect, performance varies as a function of the degree to which such
processes are self-initiated. Depressed and dysphoric people are among
those who initiate the least.
Depressed subjects comply with stated instructions, but during periods
of loose attentional control their minds go blank or wander to task irrelevant
matters--perhaps to matters of personal concern. Compared to our typical
laboratory tasks, such matters motivate attention. Furthermore, if the focus
of attention, rather than reduced capacity, is the key to understanding mem
ory impairments in depression, we ought to be able to sidestep the need
for initiative by controlling the focus of attention on the task and thereby
reduce or eliminate the impairment. Consider the following experiment with
clinically depressed subjects and controls (Hertel & Rude, 1991a). In one
condition, attention during the orienting task was poorly constrained (as it
was in the research cited by Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988), and subsequent free
recall of targets from the more difficult trials was reduced in the depressed
sample. In another condition, however, we constrained attention during
initial exposure and eliminated the deficit in subsequent recall. The de
pressed sample performed more slowly on a secondary task during both
orienting conditions, and so low task motivation or even reduced capacity
might characterize their state. Regardless, the important point is that so-called
capacity limitations did not predict recall when initiative was not required.
In the experiments by Hertel and Rude (1991a, 1991b), recall was most
likely determined by the degree of initial elaboration (attention to the target's
context). Free recall is the classic test of deliberate memory; it encourages
a good deal of focus on past events and therefore benefits from such focus
during initial exposure (see Jacoby et al., 1993). In contrast, word-identifi
cation tests that indirectly measure prior experience (i.e., more old than new
words are identified at brief exposures) benefit primarily from prior integra
tion of letters into words. Procedures for activating lexical units are assumed
to be automatic under normal reading conditions. Instructions to attend to
the perceptual features of the word's display, however, are not normal
reading conditions, and under these conditions reading should require some
initiative. In this regard, the performance on a subsequent test of word-iden
tification revealed a decreased effect of prior exposure in the depressed
sample, compared to the controls (Hertel, 1994). During the perceptual
orienting task, the depressed subjects apparently attended less often to the

330

HERTEL

words themselves, because such attention was not required. When the ori
enting task had instructed them to judge the emotional value of the words,
however, the effect of prior exposure on word identification was comparable
to that in the control group. In this case, reading was required and other
potentially self-initiated procedures during initial exposure would not be
expected to improve performance on the test of word identification. More
over, this and other indirect memory tests are probably less likely to invite
self-initiated reflections on the past. For example, a test of homophone
spelling showed no depression-related effect of prior exposure to one of
the two meanings of each homophone (Hertel & Hardin, 1990).
Compared to indirect tests, recognition tests provide more interesting
opportunities for exploring the possible effects of impaired initiative in de
pression-particularly with regard to the control of attention during the test
itself. For example, compared to controls, dysphoric students have shown
impairments in recollection-the component of recognition judgments that
represents a self-initiated focus on the past context of target items-but
comparable reliance on familiarity, the more automatic aspect of recognition
(Hertel & Milan, 1994). Further, in our earlier research on recognition, only
the nondysphoric subjects appeared to focus attention systematically on
remembering the target's context in two prior tasks and to discount familiarity
as a basis for judgment (Hertel & Hardin, 1990). When, in a subsequent
experiment, we guided the dysphoric subjects to use that attentional strategy,
their recognition judgments revealed the same pattern that characterized the
unguided judgments by their nondysphoric counterparts. Other studies also
support an initiative account of recognition in depressed states (e.g., Chan
non, Baker, & Robertson, 1993).
Reduced cognitive initiative in depressed states is consistent with symp
toms of hopelessness (Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989) and perceived
lack of control of both internal and external events (Beck, 1976). It can also
be understood in neurophysiological terms. In particular, a connection be
tween depression (as well as other emotional disorders) and attentional
control should be found in frontal-lobe hypoactivation (see Grafman, 1989).

According to Henriques and Davidson 0991), "loss of initiative, impaired
concentration, indecision .. . are all symptoms common to patients with left
anterior lesions and certain subtypes of depression" (p. 535). Their evidence
from EEG recordings of clinically depressed (unlesioned) subjects lends
further support to this connection. Mayes (1988) concluded that patients
with lesions in the frontal lobes exhibit deficits that "arise when remembering
requires the initiation and maintenance of effortful and organized strategies
.. . as well as the ability to switch from one strategy to another" (p. 121).
In PET studies, hypoactivation in the frontal lobes has been linked to both
depression (Resnick, 1992) and reduced attentional control (Posner, 1992).
In the context of frontal-lobe hypoactivation, moreover, other brain functions
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can continue to direct attention and mediate retention of emotionally relevant
events (McGaugh, 1992).
In short, at least some evidence from varied research domains paints a
picture of depressed people as those who readily attend to emotionally
negative events, ruminate about them in ways that exacerbate their depres
sion, and are not motivated to attend to other matters that might not only
benefit performance on subsequent memory tasks but aid recovery (see
Hertel, 1992). Rather than insisting that this picture is inevitable (e.g., by
stressing that depression reduces capacity), however, we should realize that
in matters of attentional control, depressed people need a little help from
their friends--or at least from their therapists.

Practical Aspects of Memory in Depressed States:
Implications for Treatment
The most obvious and perhaps the most frequently discussed avenue for
applyirig research on depression and memory lies in the clinical domain
particularly in the practices of cognitive-behavioral therapy (see Beck, Rush,
Shaw , & Emery, 1979). Although this tradition has been "cognitive" only in
the lo osest sense of the term, recently some attempts have been made to
connect the practices with experimental findings and theories in cognitive
psychology.

First, experimental evidence regarding the tendency to focus attention on
negative aspects of current and prior experience can be used in assessment.
For example, vulnerability to depression might be better detected in per
formance on cognitive tasks than in self-reports (Williams et al., 1988). Simi

larly, Nasby and Kihlstrom (1986) discussed applications to assess the po
tential usefulness of particular interventions. Therapists should also take
evidence for mood congruent recall into account in evaluating the client's
autobiographical reports.
More typically, evidence for biased attention and recall in depression has
been related to treatment domains. For example, cognitive-behavioral ther
apy includes procedures to alter negative thoughts by encouraging clients
to use their own behavior to test their beliefs (Beck et al., 1979). In a closer
analysis of how that might work, Ingram and Hollon 0986) suggested that
such self-monitorirlg procedures tend to be freer from distortions than is
retro spective recall; the results of monitoring can then be elaborated during
therapy sessions. In that setting, moreover, Nasby and Kihlstrom 0986)
recommended that therapists optimize attention to their feedback by placing
clients in happier moods prior to reinterpreting their behavior in less negative
terms than the client tends to use.
Evidence for mood-incongruent recall and the suppression of negative
thoughts is also relevant to treatment, particularly if one switches therapeutic
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horses to psychodynamic perspectives. When such mechanisms of "defense"
seem ineffective, the therapist might be inclined to encourage clients to
reveal early traumatic experiences. Although, as previously described, at
tempts to recover presumably repressed memories are fraught with recon
structive dangers, Harber and Pennebaker (1992) advocated procedures for
encouraging the revelation of suppressed (if not repressed) thoughts. They
argued that, in the long run, by virtue of associated increases in ANS and
CNS activity, thought suppression is a biological stressor that produces a
range of health problems and various cognitive side effects (e.g., stressful
dreams). "Confrontation" (by attending to the suppressed memory) should
therefore reduce these effects. Support for this latter claim mainly comes
from experiments in which college students are randomly assigned to write
or speak about either traumatic or mundane events from the past. Outcomes
in the "trauma" groups include a subsequently reduced number of physical
complaints. With respect to depression, Harber and Pennebaker implied that
disclosure should alleviate general distress by focusing attention on the
traumatic memory in the presumably safer context of their present lives.
Finally, compared to applications of research on emotionally biased cog
nition, the literature contains many fewer attempts to address general im
pairments in depression. One of the few by Watts Macleod and Morris
0988), documented the remediation of m�mory ancl concentr ;tion difficul
ties through imagery training, although subjects did not report a subjectively
experienced benefit and therefore might not initiate the procedures in the
absense of instructions. In fact, as noted by Williams et al. (1988), there has
been little research regarding transfer of remediative strategies outside the
therapeutic or experimental setting.
General impairments in depression are typically noted along quantitative
dimensions (e.g., fewer words recalled); however, q ualitative aspects of
recall might be equally important for therapeutic applications. In that regard,
Williams and his colleagues (see Williams, 1992) found that the proportion
of specific memories reported in autobiographical protocols was smaller in
groups of patients diagnosed with major depression than in various control
groups. Furthermore, this tendency toward overgeneral memories did no t

depend on the degree of the patients' current mood disturbance. Therap ists
should, therefore, not assume that overgeneral recall will disappear when
mood is temporarily better. Instead, Williams argued, therapists should try
to change the processes leading to overgeneral recall. Therapy for depressed
clients should include: practice in noticing the tendency toward overgeneral
recall, training in procedures for remembering specific aspects of both posi
tive and negative memories (so that the former can be elaborated and the
latter reinterpreted), and using diaries for recording specific details, to aid
attention at the outset. More generally, Williams 0992) advocated the de
velopment of strategies that transfer to nontherapeutic settings.
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Cognitive-behavioral therapy sometimes includes "behavioral activation
strategies" that are designed to transfer to the real world (Ingram & Hollon,

1986). Specific procedures (e.g., graded tasks) are designed to produce
success through the environmental control of attention. Other therapeutic
procedures are designed to teach clients to initiate controlled procedures
through practice in doing so. And preparation for termination of therapy
emphasizes that the skills gained in therapy can be used for future control.
Ultimately, such procedures should, according to Ingram and Hollon ( 1986),
decrease self-focused attention that has become maladaptively strong in
depressed clients. Moreover, they clearly illustrate that refocusing attention
is the key to therapeutic intervention and implicitly assume adequate atten
tional capacity. The central question, however, is whether the procedures
can be initiated during future times of distress, when potentially more pow
erful motivations guide the focus of attention, impair memory for unattended
aspects, and reinstigate the depressive state.
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